It can be argued that all the organizing principles of an altruistic morality are flawed. It is due to their dependence on terms that are not in accordance with life, and the avoidance of awareness. Nietzsche argues for the importance of the senses as a foundation for decision-making. One’s consequential cognitive processes are then the mechanisms by which one is able to interpret and act upon the initial sensory experience. This process is what determines the character and effectiveness of one’s representative ego.
When briefed on the emergency procedures for an airline crash, one may notice the sense of uneasiness that many passengers have with the idea of putting on their own oxygen mask before that of a child sitting next to them. Though the practical aspects of this priority are clearly diagrammed and it’s benefit clear, there is still a component of the passenger’s demeanor that indicates a sense of disapproval. Nietzsche would have likely viewed this hesitation to accept the procedure as a reaction. This reaction being representative of the embedded cues and mechanisms associated with self-interest. In this particular instance, it is represented as arbitrary altruism, as the reaction is more facilitated by global sentiments and social arrangements than by it’s local beneficial utility. It is of particular interest to Nietzsche what would cause one to incorrectly evaluate this situation to the point of their own detriment, and possibly the child: the original object of their morality. In Twilight of the Idols, he refers to it as a “Moral-Optical Illusion”(‘Reason’ in Philosophy: 6).
Nietzsche opens the following section with a quote from the Sermon on the Mount: “If thy eye offend thee, pluck it out”(Morality as Anti-Nature: 1). It is precisely this prescription that peaks the interest of any moral philosopher. Why would someone be offended at their own eye? Clearly this is an absurd notion, so it is not to be taken literally. However, note that this transition from the physical to the ideal is not to be taken lightly. Continuing, it is to be read as “If you are offended by something, remove it from your perspective.” This model applied to the conscious processes of an individual results in an influence on perspective by the chosen ideals. This leads towards the question of the origin of the ideals, as they are not dependant on an individual’s sensory experience, yet influence how that individual relates to it.
In the section Expeditions of the Untimely Man, Nietzsche traces the sources of altruism as an ideal. If the sources are not variable and contingent upon each situation (as they should be), this drive towards deeds of “selflessness” must come from a more inward and consistent origin. Its practitioners avoid the details of this process, as this sort of self-examination will show the true character of their pursuits: “…’Not to seek one’s own advantage’ – that is merely a moral figleaf for a quite different, namely physiological fact: ‘I no longer know how to find my advantage’…” (Expeditions of the Untimely Man: 35).
Between 1913 and 1917, a man named Kohler did experiments with apes, studying various aspects of learning. It was found that problem solving was accelerated and more expansive when the apes were given a problem whose goal they were familiar with (a banana reward). When this fact is considered in the highly social human context, it becomes apparent that one’s relationships have everything to do with their well being. While this initial realization might prompt one towards an altruistic approach, consider another experiment done using apes. In this experiment, one set of apes was put into a cage with a goal at the top of the rope. Any time one ape reached the goal, the rest of the apes were punished. In time, they began preventing each other from climbing the rope. As the experiment progressed, all the apes that were originally aware of the goal had been replaced, and now the only fact that was motivating the apes’ behavior was the pre-established social code dictating: “don’t touch the rope!” Eventually, as none of the apes knew why they were avoiding the rope, social codes perpetuate themselves far past their purpose.
This state, realized or not, is a marker. It is the true origin of altruism as a moral standard. It marks a moment where the individual is in a state of helplessness concerning the self. So perhaps while considering a scenario similar to brawl between our primate brothers, Nietzsche wrote of the altruist’s potential root motives: “…he is only acting under the influence of his want of culture, which prevents his understanding why he is really suffering…someone must be to blame for his feeling vile…common to both, unworthy in both (Christianity and Socialism), is that someone has to be to blame for the fact that one suffers…”(Expeditions of the Untimely Man: 35). He then continues to diagram how this initial internal shortcoming is then transposed onto a larger context due to the flawed perceptual framework of the altruist: “…in short, that the sufferer prescribes for himself the honey of revenge as a medicine for his own suffering…and when the Christian condemns, calumniates and befouls the ‘world’, he does so from the same instinct from which the Socialist worker condemns, calumniates and befouls society…” (Expeditions of the Untimely Man: 34).
One’s perspective on the issue of “what is and what should be” is directly correlated to their will to live, and as a result, their moral functioning. The representative rhetoric used by individuals tells of that individual’s self-awareness. If they propose what ought to be before considering what is, it is quite likely that they have no inclination to detail the procedure. It is their unremitting infatuation with an ideal that prevents them from seeing the world as it is; the necessary paradigm for problem solving. Nietzsche points out the absurdity of this expectation: “…he does not cease to make himself ridiculous. The individual is, in his future and in his past, a piece of fate, one law more, one necessity more for everything that is and everything that will be. To say to him ‘change yourself’ means to demand that everything should change, even in the past…And there have been consistent moralists who wanted man to be different, namely virtuous , who wanted him in their own likeness, namely that of a bigot: to that end they denied the world!” (Morality as Anti-Nature: 6). If the altruist’s belly is empty, everyone’s should be. This is a moral fact, regardless of their disproportionate toil unacknowledged or forgotten. This falsely posits morality (offense) as taking priority over life (perspective).
Looking at “what is” as primary is unquestionably important to Nietzsche. The error of the altruist is described as: “…mistaking the last for the first…Moral: everything of the first rank must be (*the cause of itself). Origin in something else counts as an objection…”(‘Reason’ in Philosophy: 4). This absolution of the moral is the altruist’s only right to life.